Nuclear nightmares
The case for a minimum nuclear deterrent
Despite years of reducing the number of nuclear weapons, the UK government has changed course. After the Defence review by the government, the cap on the number of nuclear weapons will now rise from 180 warheads to 260. There seems to be no reason for this beyond something from an insider who spoke to the Guardian, who said, “If we have them, let us not apologise for it, let us own it”.
There is another way to deal with nuclear weapons that does not sit comfortably on either side of this debate; it neither increases the number of warheads just because we can, nor does it disarm completely. It is an approach that combines an understanding of the risks of nuclear weapons w, whilst knowing that we probably cannot disarm fully.
To look at why my concerns around nuclear weapons exist, it is best to go back to the birth of nuclear weapons when we were still struggling to understand this force, which had just been unleashed.
Nuclear culture
What is the first memory of nuclear weapons you have? It is thankfully unlikely that it will be a real explosion, but it is likely the culture that has been created by them. We have documentaries, films and even video games dedicated to exploring nuclear weapons and their effects. This includes everything from post-apocalyptic games such as Fallout to films. However, we rarely question where this nuclear culture that surrounds us came from and how it became so prevalent.
Whilst the culture around nuclear material itself has been around for much longer, the trigger point for the culture around nuclear weapons is, unsurprisingly, with the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Initially, this fear resulted in a fascination from the press, which was often “portrayed as a ‘monster’ threatening the world”, and it started a culture that we still live with. It created everything from products such as paint to protect from nuclear blasts in 1953, and museums looking at the bombings, to fallout shelters that still exist across the United States today. Later on, with the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, it became clear that the USSR could launch nuclear bombs without warning. This was exacerbated by accidents such as Chernobyl and, more recently, by the Fukushima power plant disaster.
Radiation, a product of both nuclear accidents and bombs, also caused changes to our culture. I think it was best described by the roof runners at Chernobyl that “radiation is not only dangerous but also insidious“, roof runners being those soldiers that removed radioactive material from the roof of the reactor buildings. You cannot see it or feel it, but that does not prevent the horrors caused by high doses of radiation, something Moscow Hospital number 6 saw after the Chernobyl disaster.
The danger from nuclear weapons that was reflected in this nuclear culture is also very real, also. Whether or not nuclear weapons are used in war again, the culture, a nd perhaps more importantly, the fear around nuclear weapons will continue to influence elections and political debates. There is something about a threat which cannot be seen and can be delivered without warning.
Below is one of the attempts to deal with this fear: the cartoon turtle Bert, who can duck and cover his way of a nuclear apocalypse.
Duck and Cover, the 1951 Civil Defence Film on how school children could protect themselves from nuclear weapons.
Moving away from the brink of nuclear war
This fear and uncertainty have thankfully culminated in some moves away from nuclear warheads. The tensions of the Cold War resulted in the USSR and the USA entering negotiations on nuclear arms reduction with the Reykjavík Summit of 1986. However, neither the USSR nor the USA wanted to be left without the bomb if the other side still had it. We also had the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 2011 to reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons by 30% and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which resulted from the unsuccessful negotiations at Reykjavík.
These agreements reduced the number of nuclear weapons held by the USA and Russia, and previously the USSR. However, the efforts also extended to reducing not only nuclear weapons in the present but also to stopping countries from developing nuclear weapons in the future. The biggest breakthrough here was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This created a situation where states that had weapons before 1 January 1967 could keep them, and any countries that did not have nuclear weapons by then could not develop them. This did not stop countries outside of the pre-1967 group from obtaining them by not signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, most notably India and Pakistan.
For all the progress, nuclear weapons still exist, and even the international agreements that try to limit their spread have not been completely successful. We are very much in a world where the danger we discussed before is still here, and so are nuclear weapons, even if there are fewer of them than during the Cold War.
Total disarmament
The question is then how we deal with this issue. One approach would be to disarm fully regardless of what other countries do, especially considering how dangerous these weapons are. In this situation, we would probably end up relying on the United States for protection through NATO under Article 5 which states that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area“.
The issue with this is that it relies on NATO allies retaliating to a nuclear strike on the UK. It is not a guarantee that they would strike back if the UK were attacked. It also removes the idea of having a deterrent that striking a country will mean retaliation. Whilst there is no guarantee that the UK would fire nuclear warheads in the event of an attack, it is far more likely than another country doing so for the UK. This is the way that most of the arguments for full and unilateral disarmament do not really hold up. Whilst other countries would retain nuclear weapons, we would have no real way to deter a nuclear attack.
There are, however, huge ethical issues with using a nuclear bomb or even possessing a bomb that could kill so many people. The problem is, removing our nuclear weapons does not remove the risk of nuclear war; if anything, it means we no longer have a deterrent.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
If the issue is other countries having nuclear weapons and the possibility that they could use those weapons, then a solution may be for all countries to give up nuclear weapons. This would remove a lot of the issues with having no deterrent, but there is a long way to go before this can be an option. It would need all countries to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, especially those that currently have nuclear weapons. However, as I mentioned earlier, India and Pakistan are not even members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, let alone countries like North Korea. It would also be difficult to know whether North Korea was complying with the treaty without checks that it would be unlikely to agree to. Even then, it requires countries to trust each other not to create weapons. If they do, then they will have a weapon and no one else will have a deterrent. It is unlikely with checks, but would it be worth the risk?
Therefore, even if a world without nuclear weapons may be better, it just does not seem achievable. At least not in today’s world of opposing sides and distrust. There needs to be trust that other countries will comply with UN weapons inspections, that no one will build nuclear weapons behind the backs of others and that everyone will sign up to such an agreement in the first place.
Accidents with nuclear weapons
Whilst we need nuclear weapons as a deterrent, there is an issue when it comes to accidents. If we keep nuclear weapons,s we will have a deterrent, but it also means we could start a nuclear war by accident. This is an argument I learnt a lot about as a student at Aberystwyth University, and accidents with nuclear weapons have occurred before. There is an unclassified list of accidents from the Department of Defence, and part of the solution requires increased safety around transport, but there is only so much that can be done.
This causes a dilemma: keep the deterrent and risk an accident that starts nuclear war, or lose the deterrent but not have to worry about a nuclear accident caused by the UK.
A minimum nuclear deterrent
The answer to this is fairly simple: a minimum nuclear deterrent. This is much like the path we have already been down with countries doing deals together on disarmament, much like was seen at the Reykjavik Summit on arms control. The goal is for countries to have as few nuclear weapons as possible without having to disarm completely.
A reduction in nuclear warheads would reduce the chance of an accident by keeping the number of nuclear weapons to a minimum. It would also mean the UK would continue to maintain a deterrent, creating a balance between reducing the risk of accidents and keeping a deterrent.
If we reduce the number of warheads we have in the future, the waste from decommissioned warheads could be used for nuclear power. That means much less waste to deal with, more electricity for the grid and more time for expanding our use of renewable energy in the form of wind, solar or wave power.
This brings me back to what I started this article with, the UK government’s plan to increase the number of nuclear warheads we have. The actual explanation for this increase in the Integrated Review was “However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads“. The issue is that it does not explain why this increase is needed, and some of the language used has not exactly given me much hope that this is just to keep a minimum deterrent.
We need more clarity from the government on its plan to increase our nuclear stockpile. Increasing it may have become an issue simply of looking strong, but in reality, more weapons mean more potential for accidents, and it will not help us to push nuclear arms reduction if we are increasing the number of warheads we have. We need to work towards a world with fewer nuclear weapons, and maybe someday a world without them may be possible.
About the author
Torrin Wilkins
Director and Founder
Torrin is the Founder and Director of the Centre. His experience includes authoring over a dozen papers and over one hundred policies. His policies have been backed by an All-Party Parliamentary Group of over 260 MPs and included in various party manifestos. He regularly appears in a wide range of print and broadcast media and previously had a weekly column for a national publication. He also has a degree in Political Studies from Aberystwyth University.
Become a member
Joining Centre means you can be part of an organisation which is working to rebuild the centre ground of UK politics. By becoming a member, you’ll have the chance to engage with our work early, influence policy development, and connect with others who share your vision for a more centrist politics.